Introduction 1
This paper discusses the economic performance of Latin America in the last decade, paying special attention to growth and the financial sector. In particular, it shows that external factors, such as like U.S. interest rates and the business cycle, play a key role in capital inflows, investment, and growth. 2 As a result, economic growth in the region tends to be fragile and exhibits a high degree of co-movement, i.e., high cross-country output correlation. This last feature exacerbates fragility, because there is little room for mutual insurance within Latin America in case a country suffers a bad shock, and finance during downturns has to come primarily from outside the region.
The "Lost Decade" of the 1980s and the recovery of the early 1990s are clear illustrations of these tendencies. During the 1980s the slow resolution of the debt crisis kept Latin American countries outside the international private capital market. In contrast, the 1990s brought a dramatic increase in capital inflows that exceeded expectations. In addition, whenever crises struck, their negative effect on growth was dramatic.
This paper will provide some clues regarding the big swings in capital inflows. It will argue that although these swings are oftentimes triggered by external factors, domestic financial vulnerabilities could seriously contribute to magnifying them. Thus, crisis depth is positively correlated with phenomena like a weak banking sector and large debt amortizations. However, it will also be argued that the central capital market has represented an additional source of disturbance for all Emerging Market Economies (EMs) and not just Latin America.
The central capital market has been instrumental in intermediating capital inflows to EMs since 1990. Unfortunately, however, this market was not impervious to shocks. This became evident during the Russian crisis in which big players in the central market were subject to a liquidity crunch, eventually prompting the Federal Reserve Board and the European Central
Bank to lower interest rates. In the meantime, EM securities suffered a serious slump from which they have not yet fully recovered. As a result, EMs, and especially Latin America, have been facing sharply higher interest rates. The paper identifies this phenomenon as a key cause of incomplete growth recovery in Latin America.
The paper is organized in three main sections. First, we review growth and economic performance in Latin America over the last 30 years and identify the importance of external finance in explaining them. The second section focuses on the novel conditions in external finance and real economic activity during the past decade, concluding with an analysis of the current state of affairs in Latin America. Finally, we close with some remarks on policy in light of these analyses.
Growth in Latin America: The Importance of External Factors
Perhaps the most salient characteristic of growth performance in Latin America is the remarkable importance of external factors. Whether the region regains its growth momentum previous to the recent downturn-in 1997 Latin American displayed its fastest growth since the early 1970s-crucially depends on when, if at all, the international environment upset by recent financial turmoil returns to normal. The following analysis focuses on this critical factor of growth performance.
3
Common Factors Behind Latin American Performance
Since most external factors affecting Latin America are common across countries in the region (although an important exception is the price of specific export commodities), the importance of external factors can be gauged by looking at the common features of the performance of individual countries. This approach has been intensively used to analyze financial phenomena in both quantity and price dimensions. For example, it was used by Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) , subsequently CLR, to study the role of external factors in the surge of capital inflows in the early 1990s (quantity), and it was also the methodological basis of Fernández-Arias and Rigobon (2000) , subsequently FR, in their study of international financial contagion in spreads and returns (prices). Since financial issues are central to growth in Latin America, in this article we will refer to and revisit the analysis in these and related papers as we go along, as well as open new views on other dimensions.
The evolution of economic growth in Latin America follows a consistent pattern across countries, which suggests that common factors external to the region are very important for growth. The growth rates in individual countries have a very large degree of co-movement, i.e., they tend to go up and down together. As a result, the simple average of country growth rates over time exhibits very ample swings, significantly deviating from the stable growth rate that would be expected if they were uncorrelated. The changes in the average growth over time,
shown in Figure 1 , are significant and explain a large portion of the variation in growth changes of individual countries (they reduce or "explain" about one-fourth of the overall variation). In fact, this is one major reason why the overall variation of growth rates over time, or growth rate volatility, is so large in Latin America (see Inter-American Development Bank, 1995) . 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Year Note: Simple Average across countries
If the magnitude of the common external shock is measured by the change in average growth, it is possible to estimate the proportion of this common impulse that gets transmitted into each country's growth.
4 Table 1 shows that countries differ in the degree to which they are sensitive to external factors, but within a limited range. One implication of the importance of external factors for growth performance in Latin America is that prospects need to be analyzed with an emphasis on the likely evolution of the external environment, which is the strategy we follow in this document and in our companion paper, Calvo, Fernández-Arias, Reinhart and Talvi (2001) . However, external does not necessarily mean exogenous and/or insensitive to domestic policy. First, the degree to which external factors affect economies depends on domestic policies. These important policy issues are discussed in the concluding section of this document. Second, many important external financial factors are now under discussion under the rubric of international financial architecture and are amenable to policy intervention at the international level.
The Importance of External Financing
Growth is closely associated with the magnitude of the net flows of capital into the region (see Figure 2 ). In fact, regional output growth and private net flows, measured as a proportion of GDP, are positively correlated (34%). The notorious volatility of these net flows is associated with the high growth volatility of the region. 8 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Why is this so? A large net influx of capital from abroad allows economies to finance large current account deficits (without depleting limited reserves), and therefore to invest domestically beyond their national savings. 6 The typical macroeconomic outcome is that larger net flows of capital are associated with larger current account deficits, greater investment and lower savings. The observed correlations among these time series, shown in Table 2 , bear out these expected relationships. (Larger current account deficits are supported by real exchange rate appreciation. Usually, the effect of net capital flows on the current account, and hence on the real exchange rate, is partially offset by variations in international reserves. An analysis of these and other macroeconomic relationships can be found in CLR.) 
Capital Flows and Macroeconomics in Latin America
The previous line of reasoning tells only part of the story. When access to capital markets is closed, which happens with distressing frequency in Latin America, the collapse of real activity is dramatic. The collapse caused by a sudden swing in the level of the capital account, or "sudden stop," sets in motion a destructive process in the real economy as credit dries up throughout the economy and production is strangled (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2000a for a detailed analysis). The drastic growth slowdown and recession that followed "sudden stops" in net capital flows (e.g., after the 1982 debt crisis and after the 1998 Russian crisis) are apparent in Figure 2 . The difference in average growth between years with open access to financial markets and with closed access to them is more than two percentage points.
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Our econometric analysis, based on pooled information from Latin American country experiences over the last 30 years on the quantitative relationship between capital flows and domestic economic activity, confirms the importance of these linkages (see Table 3 
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Note 3: GDP in PPP current dollars.
The availability of external finance also plays a critical role as an insurance device against adverse economic shocks. For example, it may allow consumption and investment levels 7 Access periods are 1975-1981 and 1990-1997. 8 In this econometric exercise dollar GDP is valued at PPP terms and is therefore less than GDP in nominal dollars. Therefore the previous results apply to capital flows of about one and one-half points of GDP as customarily measured.
to be maintained in the face of natural disasters. The ability to finance negative shocks to export prices is also key to maintaining equilibrium in the balance of payments, which may otherwise be translated into lower investment and growth. As is well known, Latin America faces very volatile international terms of trade and export prices (see IDB, 1995 and Figure 3) . The ability to finance these negative shocks is very important in compensating for the absence of explicit insurance mechanisms for these key prices and the lack of export diversification in Latin America.
The worst scenario is when negative external shocks, such as deterioration in commodity export prices, coincide with lack of access to external financing. As we will see, this was the kind of "double whammy" that hit the region in recent years. The sharp decline in commodity prices that began with the Asian crises of 1997 combined with the drying-up of external financing that followed the Russian crisis of 1998 to cause a sharp recession (see Figure 3) .
Unfortunately, the convergence of both bad scenarios is not coincidental. Deteriorating price conditions worsen country creditworthiness and thus impede access to financial markets. This perverse feature of low creditworthiness makes lack of export diversification extremely costly and heightens the fragility of Latin America's economic activity. Fernández-Arias (1995) analyzed the channels through which lower international interest rates contributed to this new wave of capital inflows. The key insight is that the direct effect that international interest rates (r) have on the cost of capital (i) in any economy that is financially integrated into the world is only part of the story, and perhaps not the most important one in high-risk countries. In fact, there is also an indirect channel of influence by which international interest rates affect country creditworthiness, and therefore risk spreads (s) and cost of capital.
This unconventional channel, explained below, was shown to be very important in the period under study. For completeness, we now add a third, residual channel (x) to capture other sources of variation, whose nature we will explore in the next section:
i (cost of capital) = r (riskless international interest rate) + s (risk spread) s = s(d,r,x), where d is an indebtedness indicator (e.g., debt-to-GDP ratio)
x is an unknown third factor
In this formulation, the risk spread depends not only on traditional debt indicators relating external liabilities to resource bases (such as exports, GDP, or tax revenue) but also on the level of international interest rates, so that country creditworthiness also depends on external factors.
In particular, a lower interest rate r leads to a lower spread s and reinforces the direct effect on cost of capital i, which is further reduced. The reason for this creditworthiness channel of transmission is that the country's capacity to pay depends on the present value of future resources, which increases as the discount rate declines. In high-risk countries, i.e., countries with high risk spreads, this indirect effect may be large and dominate the direct effect. In this sense, developing country bonds are like corporate high-risk bonds, whose spreads are very sensitive to the market value of the firm and could be subject to credit rationing. As an illustration, Figure 4 shows the recent decline in Latin American long-term sovereign bond spreads during January 2001 caused by the US Fed rate reduction of 100 basis points. As predicted, the effect on high-spread bonds is larger than on low-spread, investment-grade bonds.
U.S. corporate junk bonds also benefited. In fact, the Pure High Yield spread index of Bear and Sterns declined even more over the same period, by about 170 basis points. American sovereign risk spreads starting in 1997 can be interpreted in this way (see Figure 5 ).
With the Russian crisis, however, spreads skyrocketed without any measurable change in the identified variables in the equation above, domestic fundamentals (d) and world interest rate (r).
We therefore attribute this change to the residual unknown x. What is the nature of x? What caused this shift in the spread schedule? We address this question in the next section, but it is important to point out that the increase in spreads starting in 1998 resulted from a new form of external factor that will be termed "financial contagion," which led to the widespread increase in EM bond spreads. External financing is directly affected by these exogenous financial conditions. An increase in the cost of capital leads to less external financing, less investment, and less growth.
If such an increase is based on a large risk spread, a sudden stop occurs. In turn, less growth leads to worsening capacity to pay and creditworthiness, which increases risk spreads and reinforces the increase in the cost of capital.
Financial Globalization in the 1990s: A Roller Coaster Ride for Emerging Markets
We now focus on changing financial conditions and growth performance during the past decade by examining capital flows in terms of both volume and composition, their price in terms of bond spread, and economic activity. As a result of this "roller coaster ride," bond spreads appear to have ratcheted up at every turn since the Asian crisis in 1997, casting a long shadow over the future. At the same time, economic activity has slowed down and not yet fully recovered in most countries.
The New Wave of Capital Inflows
Latin America saw a strong revival of capital inflows starting in 1990 after a long period of external financing constraints during the debt crisis of the 1980s. With only a brief interruption around the Mexican crisis in 1994-95, this resurgence continued to increase until the Russian crisis in 1998 (see Figure 6 ). This phenomenon can be observed with remarkable similarity across countries in the region (see CLR). This outbreak was even more pronounced in the rest of the emerging markets starting in 1989. The universality of this new wave of capital inflows suggests that its root cause must lie in developments in central rather than peripheral countries. 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total This new wave of inflows to the region was not unprecedented. As shown in Figures 6 and 7, at their peak, similar levels of net capital flows had been observed in 1981, although at that time they proved to be short-lived and unsustainable. Interestingly, inflows are also not unprecedented in the fast-growing Asian crisis countries when capital flows are measured in relation to the size of the host economies. 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total emerging market economies Asia, crisis countries Western Hemisphere Note: Net Capital Flows (includes capital flight) Source: WEO, Oct 2000.
However, the new wave of capital flows to Latin America in the 1990s exhibited a different composition. Its most striking feature was the great importance of previously negligible portfolio flows, both of debt and equity nature (see Figure 8) . 10 At the same time, bank borrowing was negligible or even negative, in contrast with the experience in other emerging markets, including the Asian crisis countries (see Figure 9 ). FDI exhibits extremely high growth over the decade, but this feature is not specific to Latin America. The explosive path that FDI followed in the region in this decade is comparable to that in emerging markets overall (see Figure 10) , and also qualitatively similar to that observed in industrial countries in the same period. In recent years FDI has represented almost 100 percent of overall net capital inflows, but this situation is likely to change as conditions for debt financing normalize (see Hausmann and Fernández-Arias, 2000) . 
The Second Half of the 1990s: Financial Crises and Contagion
Another important characteristic of capital inflows in the 1990s was that funds were largely directed to the private sector (see . By contrast, in the previous inflow episode that led to the debt crisis, external financing was mostly directed toward financing public sector deficits. Initially, this break with the past was seen as insurance against balance of payments crises, because it was expected that the corporate sector knew what it was doing. For this reason, the Mexican crisis of late 1994 came as a surprise to many.
The new features of the Mexican crisis were linked to the bonded nature of the new capital inflows. The refusal of bondholders to roll over short-term public bonds led to Mexico's inability to come up with the resources to pay on such short notice. The key lesson from this experience was that countries were financially more fragile than previously thought: even if their long-term capacity to pay was sufficient to cover obligations, they could be rendered insolvent if a critical mass of investors exited at once. In this situation, foreign investors could rationally refuse to lend, and a crisis would ensue. Thus, liquidity crises were shown to be a distinct possibility for sovereigns.
12 The subsequent creation of secondary bond markets across emerging markets may have diluted this initial advantage as a portfolio opportunity by contributing to the establishment of an emerging market "investment class."
Financial contagion was felt throughout Latin America and beyond in bond spreads and other financial indicators, and for a period many countries lost market access. The international official sector reacted quickly by putting together for the first time a large rescue package.
Financial contagion disappeared in a few months, Mexico adjusted deeply but quickly recovered, the rescue package was repaid, investors came back, and the episode was brushed aside as an anomaly.
The second crisis episode was the string of Asian crises of 1997 in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. These crises hit some of the high-growth, high-savings emerging markets considered the best risks at the time. It became apparent that liquidity crises were also a possibility in the case of bank lending, whether intermediated through the domestic banking system or directly allocated to local firms. Some observers have argued that the Asian crisis was provoked by the presence of public sector guarantees, strengthened by the Mexican bailout. However, the evidence does not support the view that moral hazard played an important role . The main lesson, once again, is that liquidity crises are a real danger and that policy ought to focus on the fragility of the financial system (Calvo and Fernández-Arias, 2000) .
As expected, the Asian crises hit Latin America through trade channels, depressing export commodity prices. What was not expected was the significant financial contagion in bond spreads: the Latin American bond spread index increased by about 200 basis points in October 1997. In fact, over half of the jump was recovered over the following few months; by end-July 1998, just prior to the Russian crisis, it had already returned to its peak level (see Figure   5 ).
The biggest surprise for Latin America was the aftermath of the Russian default in August 1998. Russia is a country with very little real linkage with Latin America, and it represents less than 1 percent of world output. And yet, the financial contagion shock wave was enormous, similar to that felt in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis in 1995. The Latin American bond spread index jumped by 700 basis points to more than 1100 points. The (unweighted) average spread on long-term bonds of the four largest Latin American economies soared even higher (see Figure 11 ). The corresponding Loss Equivalent Fraction (LEF), equal to the fraction of the contractual value of the bond that would not be expected to be recovered in a fair contract 13 skyrocketed to 60% and has remained consistently above 40%! Two other characteristics of contagion are worth noting in order to understand its nature.
First, it was widespread across countries (and regions too), which points to a common factor beyond the real economy. For example, witness the sensitivity to contagion of various countries in the three crisis episodes of the 1990s shown in Figure 12 . Second, while the implied absolute valuations of spreads are difficult to rationalize in terms of risk of default because they suddenly become so large, the relative valuations across countries remained unchanged, which suggests that the market rationally discriminates (see FR). 13 The expected present value of the contractual stream of payments that would paid in excess of its nominal value in the absence of default-and therefore would be expected to be unpaid in a fair contract. How does one make sense of these facts? The theory most consistent with all the evidence is that financial contagion was caused by weakness of the financial intermediaries investing in emerging markets. In the Russian crisis, accumulated losses and high leverage led to a liquidity crunch, forcing a sell-off of emerging country paper across the board at fire sale prices (see Calvo, 1998 for an analysis). This explanation is consistent with the fact that the cross-country correlation of bond returns increases during bad times (FR and IMF, 2001 ).
Furthermore, bond spreads showed a strong tendency to recover prior levels after each outbreak (see Figure 11 above), as could be expected from a temporary market disequilibrium offering arbitrage opportunities. For example, by the end of 1998, only three months after the worst of the Russian crisis, risk spreads had recovered most of their losses (albeit helped by generous liquidity policies of industrial countries concerned with the health of their own financial institutions, such as LTCM). The Brazilian devaluation of January 1999 was no more than a brief interruption of this process, which was again underway as early as March. This rapid recovery pattern was followed closely by individual countries. Yet, since mid-1999 spreads have not shown any consistent trend and recovery has not been completed in full. Similarly, the increase in risk spread in the second half of 1997 had not been offset by the time the Russian crisis hit. During 2000 spreads showed a general tendency toward deterioration. In sum, recovery was fast but limited. Table 4 On the basis of the spread equation above, in which the bond spread is a function of the international interest rate and of capacity to pay, as measured by traditional indebtedness indicators, we first look at the evolution of these two variables as a first attempt at explanation.
Dollar interest rates at all maturities are low by historical standards (see Figure 13) . The most immediate explanation of bond spreads' ratcheting up is that the market perceives worse country prospects in Latin America. 15 Perhaps it is the expectation of a backlash of the structural reforms of the 1990s, which did deliver faster growth (Fernández-Arias and Montiel, 1997) but failed to improve income distribution (IDB, 1999) . Alternatively, perhaps the growth gains of reform were less long-lived than previously thought and sustainable growth is being revised downwards. However, while these hypotheses may have some validity they do not bode well with the widespread nature of the increase in bond spreads during 2000. As shown in Figure 15 , it is not only that spreads increased in emerging countries in general, both inside and 15 At the outset, it is intuitively difficult to rationalize expected contractual losses of 50%, as shown in the LEF index in Figure 11 , on the basis of the countries' payments records.
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outside Latin America, but also that they increased substantially in the US corporate high-yield segment. This evidence suggests that some of the important underlying forces are unrelated to any reassessment of countries' prospects. Alternatively, the issue of how the official sector involves itself in financial crises in EMs may be at the root of the increase in bond spreads. One such explanation was born after IMF refused to rescue Russia and its default caused substantial losses to investors. This loss has been mentioned as a good reason why the market reassessed the risk of default in all other emerging markets, anticipating that they might not be rescued in the future. This argument is usually made in reference to the elimination of the moral hazard that official rescue packages would have provided before the Russian crisis, but such a linkage is unnecessary. Justified or not, less official support at time of crises, either because of a change in policy or because the necessary economic and political resources erode over time, implies higher private risk (for a given country's fundamentals). A variant of this explanation, upon which the private sector places substantial weight, is that the unpredictability of the rules of engagement of the official sector, more than their change, creates fear of an unnecessary or abusive private sector bail-in (private sector involvement, or PSI) and drives up the perception of risk.
This set of explanations rings true and could account for the widespread deterioration in financial conditions in EMs, but, again, cannot account for the increase in junk bond spreads or other related phenomena in industrial countries, which we analyze below. Furthermore, the extent to which it can be sustained in light of the actual experience of official intervention is uncertain. Even under the pessimistic expectation that the official sector will not be able to make its role more effective in the international financial architecture it is trying to design, the official sector has at least shown its readiness and ability to support fast recovery when economic fundamentals are satisfactory, as in Mexico or Korea. It is true that some of the perceptions of the new doctrine of PSI may have scared the market at times, but the emergency packages of Brazil and Argentina should have gone a long way toward counteracting such impressions.
Finally, there are explanations grounded in problems with financial markets. Country risk, or the probability of default, may have been reassessed simply because we have observed new and unexpected situations that may lead to crisis. For example, as explained above, liquidity crises may appear more likely now. The implication is that the imputed probability of default conditional on given economic fundamentals would be revised upwards, thus leading to an apparently unjustified increase in spreads. Under this interpretation, financial globalization entails more risk than meets the eye under solvency considerations only, and traditional solvency-based creditworthiness indicators ought to be replaced by more comprehensive indicators encompassing overall financial fragility (see Calvo and Fernández-Arias, 2000) .
The collapse in bond prices due to international financial contagion is another mechanism by which bond spreads may increase for given countries' fundamentals. Even under the assumption that the phenomenon is temporary and the probability of default remains unaffected, bondholders anticipating the need to sell in bad times will demand higher spreads in return.
Emerging country paper is extremely illiquid in bad times and consequently entails large capital losses to those forced to sell, which increases the market cost of country default and further distorts the traditional relationship between solvency indicators and spreads.
The large variability and correlation among EM bond returns could also be a reason for a negative market reassessment of the portfolio value of these bonds to risk-averse investors.
Higher spreads may have resulted not from considerations of default but from portfolio risks associated with lower diversification value, which would imply that country spreads and LEFs depend not only on country default probabilities but also on how a country's bond returns fluctuate in relation to those in other markets. In fact, returns are highly correlated across countries in all emerging markets and even with junk bonds in industrial countries (see Figure   15 ), which diminishes the portfolio value of emerging market bonds and demands a higher spread for any given default probability. The same is true with the correlation between bond returns in Latin America and the US NASDAQ stock index, which supports the view that all high yield investments, including US stocks, belong to the same class (see Figure 16 ). In fact, it is tempting to think that investors specialized in high yield investments contaminate all high yield markets through contagion in the very attempt to hedge through diversification. The end result is to kill diversity. Note: LEI is Latin Eurobond Index Spreads (JP Morgan), re-based. Nasdaq is US Stock Market Price Index, re-based. Correlation is the correlation coefficient of daily bonds and stock returns over the previous six months,(EMBI+LAC Price Index and Nasdaq respectively). Source: Bloomberg and own calculations.
It is not clear, however, that the cross-country correlation of bond returns is higher now than it was before the Asian and the Russian crises (IMF, 2001) , and therefore this factor would not contribute directly to explaining the increase in spreads over time that we are analyzing. The same holds true in connection with NASDAQ in Figure 16 . Nevertheless, the correlations involving EM bond returns increase in bad times (FR, IMF, 2001) . If more crises are expected in the future, correlation considerations, like liquidity considerations analyzed above, would reinforce the increase in spreads.
Real Activity and Investment
The roller coaster behavior of capital flows and financial market conditions were reflected in a similar roller coaster behavior of the real economy in Latin America. This is illustrated in Figure   17 , which shows annualized quarterly growth rates of (seasonally adjusted) GDP for the simple average of the seven major countries in Latin America, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Russian crisis; second, a recession phase (1998 -III/1999 in the aftermath of the Russian crisis; third, a recovery phase (since 1999-III) after the Brazilian devaluation did not develop into a fullblown crisis (thanks in part to the international support that was absent in the case of Russia) and financial conditions started to normalize in mid-1999. The deceleration-recession phase implied a huge turnaround in output growth rates starting in the third quarter of 1997. This turnaround was broad-based and highly synchronized and it affected, without exception, the seven major Latin American economies. Table 5 shows the year on year GDP growth rates for each country in the 12-month period prior to the Asian crisis (1996 -II/1997 and in the deceleration and recession phases described above. In the two- The high synchronization of the business cycle among the seven major Latin American economies is even more striking when we use quarterly, seasonally adjusted GDP data in order to perform a business cycle analysis to identify peaks and troughs in economic activity. Table 6 shows that economic activity, as measured by GDP, peaked by the second quarter of 1998 (i.e., prior to the Russian crisis) in every country with the exception of Mexico (where output growth rates decelerated significantly but did not actually fall).
The recession that followed had an average duration of four quarters and output fell by an average of 5 percent. 16 Peru and Brazil experienced relatively mild declines (2 percent) while Venezuela and Colombia were the most severely affected, with output declines of 9 percent and 7 percent, respectively. Argentina, with an output decline of 5 percent and Chile, at 4 percent, were in the middle of the pack.
17
16 For our purposes a recession is defined as two consecutive quarters of decline in GDP. The size of a recession is measured by the cumulative decline in output from peak to trough. 17 It is interesting to note that the 1998-99 recession cycle was not particularly deep when compared to the recession cycle that followed the Mexican devaluation in December 1994, but it was broader and more persistent. The average decline of output from peak to trough during the current recession cycle was 4.8 percent, (compared to 5 percent during the 1995 recession cycle) but the duration was twice as large (four quarters vs. two quarters). 30% 1996 .I 1996 .II 1996 .III 1996 .IV 1997 .I 1997 .II 1997 .III 1997 .IV 1998 .I 1998 .II 1998 .III 1998 .IV 1999 .I 1999 .II 1999 .III 1999 Investment, a crucial variable for the future growth prospects of the region, displayed a pattern very similar to that of GDP, namely, a deceleration-recession-phase followed by a (relatively weak) recovery phase as illustrated in Figure 18 . The turnaround in investment growth rates during the deceleration-recession phase was even larger than that of GDP. As Table 7 illustrates, in the two years from the second quarter of 1997 to the second quarter of 1999 the decline in investment growth rates was on average 27 percentage points (three times the turnaround in GDP growth rates) going from positive to negative in every single country except Mexico (where investment growth decelerated significantly but never actually fell). The major turnarounds were Colombia (41.4%), Argentina (36.3%), Peru and Chile (27.5%). The business cycle analysis of investment behavior is presented in Table 8 . Again the behavior of investment shows a high synchronization, peaking in every country at approximately the same time although, in general, prior to GDP. The average decline in investment was 22%
(ranging from 5% in Brazil to 47% in Colombia) and the average duration of the investment recession was 6 quarters (two quarters longer than GDP).
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The recovery phase of investment was also highly synchronized and started in the third quarter of 1999. However, only Brazil is close to full recovery of the investment levels prevailing prior to the beginning of the recession. In the rest of the countries, investment levels 20 The duration of the investment recession was twice as large as the one that followed the Tequila crisis.
remain well below their previous peak: 12% in Venezuela, 17% in Chile, 25% in Argentina, 26%
in Peru and 35% in Colombia. 21 This behavior of investment is consistent with the substantial increase in bond spreads (the ratcheting effect described in the previous section) that followed the Russian crisis. The deterioration in external financial conditions may have led to a downward revision in the desired degree of leverage on the part of firms, leading to a potentially protracted period of relatively low levels of investment as firms adjust their balance sheets to the new situation. As we point out in the next section, governments ought to seriously consider precisely this policy of reducing their debt levels in the face of extraordinarily high levels of interest rates.
Economic Policy Issues: What Can Be Done to Brighten the Future?
There is a yawning gap between developed and Latin American countries in terms of output per capita, income distribution and poverty indexes. This is a source of concern but, at the same time, a source of hope. As argued by Parente and Prescott (2000) , growth miracles occur in countries that start from a relatively backward stage. Their very backwardness represents a window of opportunity. The challenge is thus to find effective ways of removing the barriers to growth.
The present paper has shown that output performance in Latin America is closely linked to external variables. This does not deny the existence of deep-seated, slow-moving, local issues that keep the region from replicating successful growth experiences in other parts of the world, but it suggests that, given those, external factors are an important determinant of growth.
Consequently, many of the potentially most effective policy actions to promote Latin American growth are concerned with reforming the international financial architecture. 22 In this respect, the "bad news" is that there is little individual EMs can do to change the international environment. Such policy actions, which exceed the scope of this paper, require difficult multilateral coordination. However, the "good news" is that how this environment impacts on an individual country depends, to some extent, on domestic policy, an issue that will be explored next.
To begin with, notice that the impact of financial crises is a function of the level of indebtedness and capital-inflow dependency. A country with no debt and no current account deficit, for example, is unlikely to be seriously hurt by international financial turmoil. Maturity should be managed in such a way that the country would, most of the time, be able to meet its net debt obligations, i.e., net of credit lines that could be activated in case old creditors refuse to roll over their credits at reasonable interest rates (this is related to the GuidottiGreenspan proposal; see Guidotti, 2000) . However, as shown above, several countries in the region face extraordinarily high interest rates on their long-term debt. Thus, this maturity management strategy might not be feasible or, at least, could be excessively costly. Thus, the lesson for policymakers: follow a tight fiscal policy that would lower the public sector debt/GDP ratio to levels where the maturity strategy has an acceptable cost.
Still, the above public debt reduction policy may be ineffective in lowering countryspecific interest rates if the private sector is vulnerable to a sudden stop. In that case, the government may have to become a net creditor in order to be able to support the private sector in case of a sudden stop. However, political support for the policy would wane very rapidly once the non-debtors realize that the government is raising taxes to, in the end, bail out debtors.
Behavior does not happen in a vacuum. Most likely private sector exposure to sudden stops is in part due to the expectation of bailouts by the public sector. Thus, an important part of the maturity management strategy should be a decoupling of private and public sectors in order to avoid confusion and surprises as to how the burden is assigned when difficulties arise. The key is that private and public debts are kept separate: private does not become public through an after-the-fact bail-out at the expense of taxpayers and, equally important, public does not become private through a fiscal surprise (through higher taxes, for example).
Banks are an important source of the mutation of private into public debt because central banks are typically willing to bail out banks for the sake of preserving the payments system.
Thus, decoupling is difficult here. Announcements that the central bank will refrain from bailing out the banking system are hard to believe. Thus, the central bank should take preventive action.
For example, it could pursue policies that prevent banks from taking undue risks. One such policy is imposing high liquidity requirements, i.e., the share of deposits that has to be held in highly liquid assets such as international reserves. Another is to set limits to central bank credit.
Central bank independence is not enough. Independence guarantees that the central bank will not be subservient to the fisc, but it does not ensure that it will not be the pliant servant of the financial sector. During crises the latter has proven to be a more demanding master than the former. This is due in part to the fact that refusing to bail out the banking sector is very unpopular with the general public. It forces banks to repudiate bank deposits, whose official guarantees may be less than fully credible, and creates havoc in the payment system.
What about controls on short-term capital inflows? Empirical evidence shows that this kind of policy has a negligible effect on total capital flows, but it affects the maturity of international indebtedness (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2000a , for a summary of empirical results).
Thus, prima facie this seems a good strategy for ameliorating sudden stops. However, this is at best a partial solution. International debt is only one component of total (gross) debt; the other is debt among domestic residents, particularly bank loans and deposits. Thus, the maturity of total gross debt may not change. Lengthening the international component could lead to shortening the maturity of the domestic component. In fact, such a change in composition could help explain why controls on capital mobility appear to have such a small macroeconomic impact.
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Furthermore, an often heard complaint is that these types of controls discriminate in favor of multinationals, given that the latter can easily cover up short-term loans through distorted transfer prices (i.e., prices charged for transactions between headquarters and the local subsidiary) and profit remittances.
None of the above considerations has referred to the exchange rate regime and they thus equally apply to all such regimes. Experience shows, however, that exchange rate management 24 Another explanation, of course, is that the financial sector can bypass those controls.
